安全代码审查
按照 OWASP 常见风险系统审查代码中的 SQL 注入、XSS、SSRF、访问控制、加密和输入验证等问题,并提供问题解释和修复建议,适合开发阶段的安全 Code Review。
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Skill 文件
版本 20260801 · 784551f050cd60e456f42dcb4563ac90
SKILL.md
---
name: secure-code-review
description: "Systematically reviews code for SQL injection, XSS, SSRF, broken access control, cryptographic failures, and other common OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities, providing vulnerable code examples and ready-to-use remediation guidance. Trigger this skill when users ask for a security review, vulnerability scan, or penetration testing assistance, or mention keywords like OWASP, SQL injection, XSS, code audit, or security checklist."
license: MIT
---
# OWASP Top 10 Code Security Review Checklist
A systematic security review based on the OWASP Top 10 (2021) standard. Each item includes: vulnerability description, typical vulnerable code, inspection checkpoints, and remediation examples. Designed for security-focused code review of web applications.
## Usage
Provide the code files or code snippets to review, and specify which OWASP categories to check (or request a full review) to receive an item-by-item audit report.
**Example prompts:**
- "Check this code for SQL injection risks"
- "Run a full OWASP Top 10 security review on this project"
- "Does this API endpoint have any SSRF vulnerabilities?"
---
## Quick Reference
| ID | Category | Key Check |
|----|----------|-----------|
| A01 | Broken Access Control | Does every endpoint verify the current user's identity? Can users access others' data by changing IDs? |
| A02 | Cryptographic Failures | Are passwords hashed with bcrypt/argon2? Are secrets hardcoded? |
| A03 | Injection | String-concatenated SQL? `shell=True`? Unescaped template output? |
| A04 | Insecure Design | Is rate limiting in place? Can critical workflows be bypassed? |
| A05 | Security Misconfiguration | DEBUG enabled? Stack traces in error pages? Default credentials? |
| A06 | Vulnerable Components | Any CVEs from `pip audit` / `npm audit`? |
| A07 | Authentication Failures | Is JWT signature verified? Can tokens be revoked? Is MFA available? |
| A08 | Integrity Failures | Any `pickle.loads` deserializing untrusted data? |
| A09 | Logging & Monitoring Failures | Are plaintext passwords in logs? Are failed logins recorded? |
| A10 | SSRF | Are user-supplied URLs filtered against internal IPs? |
---
## Review Process SOP
**Core principle: prefer false positives over missed true positives.**
1. **Define scope** — Identify the files, modules, or code snippets to review
2. **Full coverage check** — Scan through A01-A10 sequentially. **Every item must appear in the report** (mark items with no findings as pass). The default behavior is to only report issues found — this process requires full coverage to ensure nothing is missed
3. **Risk classification** — Label each finding:
- RED High: Directly exploitable (RCE, SQL injection, SSRF reaching internal networks, plaintext password storage)
- YELLOW Medium: Exploitable under specific conditions (missing rate limiting, weak password policy, static tokens)
- GREEN Low: Defense-in-depth gap with no direct exploitation path (missing security headers, insufficient logging)
4. **Every finding must include ready-to-use fix code** (actual code, not just a description). Reference specific `file:line_number`
5. **Output the review report** — Use the template below, findings sorted by severity descending, with a prioritized remediation list at the end
---
## A01:2021 — Broken Access Control
**Risk:** Users can access other users' data or perform unauthorized operations.
**Checkpoints:**
- [ ] Does every API endpoint enforce authorization?
- [ ] Are there IDOR vulnerabilities (Insecure Direct Object References) — can users access others' data by modifying ID parameters?
- [ ] Do admin interfaces verify roles?
- [ ] Is access control enforced server-side (not just by hiding UI elements)?
- [ ] Is the CORS policy overly permissive?
### Vulnerable Code Example
```python
# ❌ Vulnerable: No authorization check — any user can view others' orders by changing user_id
@app.route("/api/orders/<user_id>")
def get_orders(user_id):
orders = db.query(f"SELECT * FROM orders WHERE user_id = {user_id}")
return jsonify(orders)
```
### Remediation Example
```python
# ✅ Fixed: Verify the authenticated user can only access their own data
@app.route("/api/orders")
@login_required
def get_orders():
current_user_id = get_current_user().id
orders = db.query("SELECT * FROM orders WHERE user_id = %s", (current_user_id,))
return jsonify(orders)
```
---
## A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
**Risk:** Sensitive data (passwords, credit card numbers, personal information) is unencrypted or uses weak cryptographic algorithms.
**Checkpoints:**
- [ ] Are passwords stored using secure hashing (bcrypt/scrypt/argon2) rather than MD5/SHA1?
- [ ] Is HTTPS enforced for sensitive data in transit?
- [ ] Are encryption keys hardcoded in the source code?
- [ ] Are deprecated cryptographic algorithms in use (DES, RC4, MD5)?
- [ ] Are sensitive database fields encrypted at rest?
### Vulnerable Code Example
```python
# ❌ Vulnerable: MD5 for password storage, hardcoded secret key
import hashlib
SECRET_KEY = "my-secret-key-123"
def save_password(password):
hashed = hashlib.md5(password.encode()).hexdigest()
db.save(hashed)
```
### Remediation Example
```python
# ✅ Fixed: bcrypt for password hashing, secret key from environment variable
import bcrypt
import os
SECRET_KEY = os.environ["SECRET_KEY"]
def save_password(password):
salt = bcrypt.gensalt()
hashed = bcrypt.hashpw(password.encode(), salt)
db.save(hashed)
```
---
## A03:2021 — Injection
**Risk:** User input is concatenated directly into SQL, OS commands, LDAP queries, etc., allowing attackers to execute arbitrary queries or commands.
**Checkpoints:**
- [ ] Do SQL queries use parameterized queries / ORM (not string concatenation)?
- [ ] Are there `os.system()` or `subprocess.call(shell=True)` calls that concatenate user input?
- [ ] Does template rendering properly escape user input (preventing XSS)?
- [ ] Are special characters filtered in LDAP / XPath / NoSQL queries?
- [ ] Are unfiltered user inputs logged directly (log injection)?
### SQL Injection — Vulnerable Code
```python
# ❌ Vulnerable: String-concatenated SQL — attacker can input ' OR 1=1 --
@app.route("/api/user")
def get_user():
username = request.args.get("username")
query = f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = '{username}'"
result = db.execute(query)
return jsonify(result)
```
### SQL Injection — Remediation
```python
# ✅ Fixed: Parameterized query
@app.route("/api/user")
def get_user():
username = request.args.get("username")
result = db.execute(
"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = %s",
(username,)
)
return jsonify(result)
```
### Command Injection — Vulnerable Code
```python
# ❌ Vulnerable: User input concatenated directly into shell command
import os
def ping_host(host):
os.system(f"ping -c 4 {host}")
```
### Command Injection — Remediation
```python
# ✅ Fixed: Use subprocess with list arguments, shell disabled
import subprocess
import re
def ping_host(host):
if not re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9.\-]+$', host):
raise ValueError("Invalid hostname")
subprocess.run(["ping", "-c", "4", host], check=True)
```
---
## A04:2021 — Insecure Design
**Risk:** Business logic design flaws that cannot be fixed by a perfect implementation.
**Checkpoints:**
- [ ] Do critical operations have rate limiting?
- [ ] Can the password reset flow be abused (username enumeration, verification code brute-force)?
- [ ] Do sensitive operations (payments, transfers) require secondary confirmation?
- [ ] Are there batch operation endpoints with no upper limit?
- [ ] Can business workflows be executed out of order (e.g., skipping payment to complete an order)?
### Vulnerable Code Example
```python
# ❌ Vulnerable: No attempt limit on verification code — can be brute-forced
@app.route("/api/verify-code", methods=["POST"])
def verify_code():
code = request.json["code"]
stored_code = session.get("verification_code")
if code == stored_code:
return jsonify({"status": "verified"})
return jsonify({"status": "invalid"}), 400
```
### Remediation Example
```python
# ✅ Fixed: Added attempt limit and expiration
@app.route("/api/verify-code", methods=["POST"])
def verify_code():
attempts = session.get("verify_attempts", 0)
if attempts >= 5:
return jsonify({"error": "Too many attempts, please request a new code"}), 429
code = request.json["code"]
stored = session.get("verification_code")
expire_at = session.get("code_expire_at", 0)
if time.time() > expire_at:
return jsonify({"error": "Verification code has expired"}), 400
session["verify_attempts"] = attempts + 1
if code == stored:
session.pop("verify_attempts", None)
return jsonify({"status": "verified"})
return jsonify({"status": "invalid"}), 400
```
---
## A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
**Risk:** Applications or servers use default configurations, enable unnecessary features, or expose sensitive information in error messages.
**Checkpoints:**
- [ ] Is DEBUG mode disabled in production?
- [ ] Do error pages leak stack traces, database versions, etc.?
- [ ] Are default credentials still in use?
- [ ] Do HTTP responses include security headers (X-Frame-Options, Content-Security-Policy, etc.)?
- [ ] Are unnecessary HTTP methods (PUT, DELETE, TRACE) disabled?
- [ ] Is directory listing disabled?
### Vulnerable Code Example
```python
# ❌ Vulnerable: DEBUG enabled in production, leaking sensitive information
app = Flask(__name__)
app.config["DEBUG"] = True
app.config["SECRET_KEY"] = "default-secret"
@app.errorhandler(500)
def error_handler(e):
return jsonify({"error": str(e), "traceback": traceback.format_exc()}), 500
```
### Remediation Example
```python
# ✅ Fixed: Configuration from environment variables, DEBUG off in production
import os
app = Flask(__name__)
app.config["DEBUG"] = os.environ.get("FLASK_DEBUG", "false").lower() == "true"
app.config["SECRET_KEY"] = os.environ["FLASK_SECRET_KEY"]
@app.errorhandler(500)
def error_handler(e):
app.logger.error(f"Internal error: {e}")
return jsonify({"error": "Internal server error, please try again later"}), 500
```
---
## A06:2021 — Vulnerable and Outdated Components
**Risk:** Using third-party libraries or framework versions with known vulnerabilities.
**Checkpoints:**
- [ ] Do dependencies have known CVEs (scan with `pip audit`, `npm audit`, `snyk`, etc.)?
- [ ] Are there dependencies that haven't been updated in a long time?
- [ ] Are any unmaintained libraries in use?
- [ ] Are lock files (package-lock.json / requirements.txt) under version control?
- [ ] Is there an automated dependency update mechanism (Dependabot, etc.)?
### Scan Commands
```bash
# Python projects
pip audit
# Node.js projects
npm audit
# General scanning
# Use open-source tools like trivy or grype to scan container/project dependencies
```
### Remediation Guidance
```bash
# Update vulnerable packages
pip install --upgrade package_name
# Auto-fix npm vulnerabilities
npm audit fix
# Pin dependency versions to prevent implicit upgrades
pip freeze > requirements.txt
```
---
## A07:2021 — Identification and Authentication Failures
**Risk:** Authentication mechanisms have flaws that allow brute-force attacks, credential stuffing, or session hijacking.
**Checkpoints:**
- [ ] Is there a login failure rate limit (account lockout / delay)?
- [ ] Is the password policy reasonable (minimum length, complexity requirements)?
- [ ] Are session tokens invalidated on logout?
- [ ] Are session IDs sufficiently random and unpredictable?
- [ ] Is MFA supported for sensitive operations?
- [ ] Are JWT tokens validated for signature and expiration?
### Vulnerable Code Example
```python
# ❌ Vulnerable: JWT signature not verified, accepts alg=none
import jwt
def verify_token(token):
payload = jwt.decode(token, options={"verify_signature": False})
return payload
```
### Remediation Example
```python
# ✅ Fixed: Enforce signature and expiration verification, specify algorithm
import jwt
import os
JWT_SECRET = os.environ["JWT_SECRET"]
def verify_token(token):
try:
payload = jwt.decode(
token,
JWT_SECRET,
algorithms=["HS256"],
options={"require": ["exp", "iat", "sub"]}
)
return payload
except jwt.ExpiredSignatureError:
raise AuthError("Token has expired")
except jwt.InvalidTokenError:
raise AuthError("Invalid token")
```
---
## A08:2021 — Software and Data Integrity Failures
**Risk:** Failure to verify the integrity of software updates, critical data, or CI/CD pipelines, enabling supply chain attacks or data tampering.
**Checkpoints:**
- [ ] Does deserialization use unsafe methods (e.g., Python's `pickle.loads` on untrusted data)?
- [ ] Does the CI/CD pipeline have integrity verification?
- [ ] Do third-party CDN resources use SRI (Subresource Integrity)?
- [ ] Are modifications to critical configuration files audit-logged?
- [ ] Does the auto-update mechanism verify signatures?
### Vulnerable Code Example
```python
# ❌ Vulnerable: Deserializing untrusted data — can lead to remote code execution
import pickle
@app.route("/api/import", methods=["POST"])
def import_data():
data = pickle.loads(request.data)
process(data)
return "OK"
```
### Remediation Example
```python
# ✅ Fixed: Use a safe data format (JSON), refuse to deserialize arbitrary objects
import json
@app.route("/api/import", methods=["POST"])
def import_data():
try:
data = json.loads(request.data)
except json.JSONDecodeError:
return jsonify({"error": "Invalid JSON format"}), 400
process(data)
return "OK"
```
---
## A09:2021 — Security Logging and Monitoring Failures
**Risk:** Lack of security event logging and monitoring, preventing timely detection and response to attacks.
**Checkpoints:**
- [ ] Are login successes and failures logged?
- [ ] Are sensitive operations (permission changes, data deletion) audit-logged?
- [ ] Are passwords, tokens, or other sensitive data accidentally included in logs?
- [ ] Are logs tamper-resistant (centralized storage, append-only writes)?
- [ ] Are alerts configured for anomalous behavior (e.g., burst of failed logins)?
### Vulnerable Code Example
```python
# ❌ Vulnerable: No logging on login failure, and plaintext password in logs
def login(username, password):
user = db.get_user(username)
if not user or not check_password(password, user.password_hash):
print(f"Login failed for {username} with password {password}")
return None
return create_session(user)
```
### Remediation Example
```python
# ✅ Fixed: Log security events without logging sensitive data
import logging
security_logger = logging.getLogger("security")
def login(username, password):
user = db.get_user(username)
if not user or not check_password(password, user.password_hash):
security_logger.warning(
"Login failed",
extra={"username": username, "ip": request.remote_addr}
)
return None
security_logger.info(
"Login successful",
extra={"username": username, "ip": request.remote_addr}
)
return create_session(user)
```
---
## A10:2021 — Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
**Risk:** The application accepts user-provided URLs and makes server-side requests, allowing attackers to access internal network resources or cloud metadata.
**Checkpoints:**
- [ ] Are there features that accept user-supplied URLs and make server-side requests (image fetching, URL previews, webhook callbacks)?
- [ ] Is the URL protocol restricted (allow only http/https)?
- [ ] Are internal IP ranges filtered (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16)?
- [ ] Is the cloud metadata address blocked (169.254.169.254)?
- [ ] Is there protection against DNS rebinding attacks?
### Vulnerable Code Example
```python
# ❌ Vulnerable: Directly requesting user-supplied URL — can access internal network and cloud metadata
import requests
@app.route("/api/fetch-url")
def fetch_url():
url = request.args.get("url")
response = requests.get(url)
return response.text
```
### Remediation Example
```python
# ✅ Fixed: Validate URL protocol and target address, block internal network access
import requests
import ipaddress
from urllib.parse import urlparse
import socket
BLOCKED_NETWORKS = [
ipaddress.ip_network("127.0.0.0/8"),
ipaddress.ip_network("10.0.0.0/8"),
ipaddress.ip_network("172.16.0.0/12"),
ipaddress.ip_network("192.168.0.0/16"),
ipaddress.ip_network("169.254.0.0/16"),
]
def is_safe_url(url):
parsed = urlparse(url)
if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
return False
try:
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(socket.gethostbyname(parsed.hostname))
for network in BLOCKED_NETWORKS:
if ip in network:
return False
except (socket.gaierror, ValueError):
return False
return True
@app.route("/api/fetch-url")
def fetch_url():
url = request.args.get("url")
if not is_safe_url(url):
return jsonify({"error": "Access to this address is not allowed"}), 403
response = requests.get(url, timeout=10, allow_redirects=False)
return response.text
```
---
## Review Report Template
After completing the review, output a report in the following format. **All 10 items must appear** — mark items with no findings as pass:
```
# OWASP Top 10 Security Review Report
## Review Summary
- Scope: [list of files/modules]
- Date: [date]
- Risk summary: RED High x | YELLOW Medium x | GREEN Low x | PASS No findings x
## Findings (sorted by severity, descending)
### [Severity] [OWASP ID] — [Issue Title]
- **Location:** [file:line_number]
- **Description:** [issue description]
- **Impact:** [potential consequences]
- **Fix:** (ready-to-use code, not just a description)
### PASS A0X — [Category] — No issues found
## Remediation Priority
1. [Most urgent fix — rationale]
2. [Next priority — rationale]
3. ...
```
---
## Recommended Open-Source Security Tools
| Tool | Language | Purpose |
|------|----------|---------|
| `bandit` | Python | Python code security scanning |
| `semgrep` | Multi-language | Rule-based code scanning |
| `eslint-plugin-security` | JavaScript | JS security rules |
| `npm audit` / `pip audit` | JS / Python | Dependency vulnerability scanning |
| `trivy` | Multi-language | Container and dependency scanning |
| `sqlmap` | — | SQL injection detection |
| `OWASP ZAP` | — | Web application dynamic scanning |
> **Note:** This checklist is a supplementary review tool and does not replace professional penetration testing. For high-security systems, combine automated scanning + manual code audit + penetration testing.
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